Today's public company executives face a considerably different set of opportunities and constraints than their counterparts from the managerial capitalism era, which reached its apex in the 1950s and 1960s. The growing prominence of corporate governance played a significant role in this process. This paper explores these developments, taking into account in so doing prominent corporate scandals occurring in the first half of the 1970s and early 2000s, the 1980s "Deal Decade", the "imperial" chief executive phenomenon and changes to the roles played by directors and shareholders of public companies.
2 work done, however, on why events unfolded in the manner they did. Conceivably the lack of analysis could be because nothing more was going on than the adoption of a handy catch phrase encompassing already familiar topics and themes. In fact, the new terminology was accompanied by a reconfiguration of governance arrangements in U.S. public companies.
These important changes coincided with and were related to the demise of a "managerial capitalism" era that reached its apex in the U.S. during the middle of the 20 th century. This paper correspondingly considers how and why corporate governance moved to the forefront in the manner it did as well as identifying the implications for executives, directors and shareholders of public companies.
Some factors that account for the emergence and subsequent prominence of corporate governance have in fact been identified. For instance, various observers have noted that reaction to and analysis of corporate scandals occurring during the first half of the 1970s helped to lift the phrase "corporate governance" from linguistic obscurity and that egregious misbehavior affecting companies such as Enron and WorldCom in the early 2000s served to "lock in" corporate governance institutionally by prompting a concerted regulatory response. by institutional shareholders as the 20 th century drew to a close helped to put corporate governance on the map. 6 This paper will focus on additional, largely unexplored, factors that contributed to the growing prominence of corporate governance. Particular emphasis will be placed on market and regulatory trends affecting the opportunity set of senior executives of public companies.
Despite neither boards nor shareholders -staples of corporate governance discourseproviding meaningful oversight of executives during the managerial capitalism era, it was relatively rare for executives to engage in the sort of misbehavior that could jeopardize, at least in the short term, the future of their companies. Various factors that constrained executives in the 1950s and 1960s, such as "boring" banking, union power and robust industry-level regulation, would be displaced or reconfigured in ensuing decades in a manner that simultaneously expanded the managerial options available to executives and increased the potential magnitude of agency costs. As the managerial capitalism era drew to a close, corporate governance, primarily in the form of more active boards and shareholders, introduced a substitute set of checks and balances. These failed to preclude the rise of the "imperial CEO" in U.S. public companies or corporate calamities such as Enron and
WorldCom. Corporate governance-related checks and balances became more robust, however, in the wake of the corporate scandals of the early 2000s and the 2008-09 financial crisis. This could mean that for the foreseeable future the managerial agency cost problem will not be as acute as it has typically been since the end of managerial capitalism era. 6 Brian R. Cheffins, "Delaware and the Transformation of Corporate Governance",
forthcoming Delaware Journal of Corporate Law, working paper version available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2531640 (2014), 13-16. 4 
Governance in the Managerial Capitalism Era
According to distinguished business historian Alfred Chandler there was during the late 19 th century and the opening decades of the 20 th century a "managerial revolution" where a growing division between ownership and control was accompanied by the flourishing of sophisticated managerial hierarchies and the development of an increasingly professional ethos among senior executives of large corporations. 7 A by-product was that in the decades immediately following World War II "managerial capitalism" prevailed in the United States, at least among large business enterprises. 8 A hallmark of managerial capitalism was that it was the norm for large public companies to lack dominant shareholders capable of and motivated to impose meaningful checks on top executives. What Adolf Berle and Gardiner
Means referred to in their famous 1932 book The Modern Corporation and Private Property
as a separation of ownership and control correspondingly became the "core fissure" in U.S.
corporate governance. During the "heyday" of managerialism 10 there was awareness that the "core fissure" affecting public companies gave rise to risks of managerial misbehavior. As economist Edward Mason said in 1959, the "independence of corporate management from any welldefined responsibility to anyone carries with it the possibilities of abuse…." 11 Theoretically, the shareholders in widely held firms prepared to act collectively could have used their right to elect the directors and other shareholder powers to keep executives in check but the prospects for shareholder activism were bleak because retail investors lacking both the appetite and aptitude to intervene in corporate affairs collectively owned most of the shares.
12
Advocates of shareholder democracy such as Lewis Gilbert received substantial newspaper coverage but the shareholder democracy movement was "small" (if "loud") and was facing "rather astounding obstacles."
13
Boards of directors also theoretically could have reduced "the possibilities of abuse". Restrictions on access to finance helped to keep managerial ambition in check, with commercial banks experiencing an era of "boring" banking due to tight regulation and with investment banks having a partnership-based organizational structure where personal liability of partners discouraged risk-taking in the form of adventurous financing of companies.
35
Organized labor was a force to be reckoned with in many industries and executives, fearful of debilitating lengthy strikes, frequently agreed to changes to work rules that could limit significantly their managerial prerogatives. "There was easy access to cheap raw materials, the cost of money was low and stable, and the major markets of the world were cut off from each other by poor communications and expensive distribution. A reasonably well-made product was always able to find a ready market, so that the producer could easily charge more than its costs and make a profit. And constant growth covered up most of our mistakes. It was indeed rather difficult to fail."
43
Matters changed as the 1960s turned into the 1970s. Meaningful foreign competition emerged for the first time in decades and the margin for error was reduced further for U.S.
companies because resources relied upon for production were becoming increasingly scare and more expensive. 44 Early casualties of these changing conditions would set the scene for both for initial regular usage of "corporate governance" terminology and increased emphasis on governance mechanisms largely ignored during the heyday of managerial capitalism.
Railways, to a greater extent than firms in many other industries, were put under intense competitive pressure in the 1950s and 1960s as airlines expanded and highway construction flourished. 45 The Pennsylvania Railroad remained sufficiently on track to keep intact its record of more than a century's worth of uninterrupted dividends but its fate was sealed by a disastrous 1968 defensive merger with the New York Central. 46 Penn Central was a "management mess", with a chairman of the board who was more interested in real The U.S. was a "first mover" with the corporate governance nomenclature. The term only came into general usage elsewhere in the 1990s, even in Britain, the corporate governance deliberations of which would turn out to be influential globally in that decade.
70
Crucially, the change in the U.S. was not merely terminological. Instead, the debates about corporate governance reflected a new approach to the challenges managerial accountability (or lack thereof) might pose. Given that neither boards nor shareholders were well-situated to intervene, during the 1950s and 1960s little store could be placed realistically in mechanisms 69 The end date of 1993 was chosen because for most major newspapers in the ProQuest database coverage ends in the early 1990s. With JSTOR "hits" listed under headings such as "front matter", "volume information", "back matter", "books received" have been excluded. what was for U.S. corporate governance "something like a hundred year flood of reform" 103 such a declaration might seem to have been premature. 104 On the other hand, it was during the 1990s that the term "corporate governance" initially gained prominence internationally.
105
Moreover, in the U.S. expectations rose under the banner of corporate governance that both boards and shareholders could and would make a substantial contribution to fostering managerial accountability.
For boards the scene was set because the Penn Central scandal and related developments in the 1970s prompted substantial changes to board composition and structure. 106 The proportion of directors of public companies who were at least nominally independent of management increased from one-quarter in 1970 to nearly three-fifths in
1990
. 107 Over the same period, it became the norm for boards to establish and delegate key tasks to audit, nomination and compensation committees comprised primarily if not entirely by independent directors. Pargendler, "Corporate Governance", p. 16. 105 Cheffins, "History", pp. 57-58.
106
On the significance of the Penn Central scandal, see "End of the Directors' Rubber Stamp", Business Week, September 10, 1979, 72 (a "watershed").
107
Gordon, "Rise", p. 1474. 108 Cheffins, "Delaware", p. 9. Another was pressing for changes to executive pay. As well as pressuring companies to strengthen the independence of compensation committees, 117 institutional shareholders lobbied companies to displace a traditional bias in favor of "pay-for-size" in favor of incentive-oriented compensation. 118 A dramatic surge in the use of equity-based pay -most prominently the awarding of stock options -duly increased markedly CEO pay-toperformance sensitivity and encouraged executives to assimilate the norm that they should strive to maximize shareholder value. 119 The legacy was, however, a problematic one. When companies. 168 Regardless of the precise causes, the imperial CEOs of banks had their wings clipped after the financial crisis in a manner similar to non-financial companies post-Enron.
Activated Shareholders
While events occurring during the 2000s might have resulted in senior executives being less flamboyant than their 1990s counterparts they were simultaneously being put under novel pressure from shareholders to refrain from simply standing pat. Shareholder activism conceivably might have been a significant force earlier but, as we have seen, in the 1990s institutional shareholders generally proved reluctant to step forward. The 2000s would be different, due primarily to hedge funds coming to prominence that specialized in targeting underperforming companies and lobbying for changes to boost shareholder returns. 169 The modus operandi of these activist hedge funds was to accumulate quietly a sizeable strategic holding, make proposals that management unlock shareholder value by off-loading weak divisions, distributing cash to shareholders or selling the company, and then count on support from other shareholders to maximize pressure on management. 
